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A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT. By Richard B. 
Brandt. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1979. Pp. ix, 362. £9.50. 
Moral philosophers have traditionally pondered two fundamen-
tal questions: (1) How can one obtain moral knowledge? and 
(2) What substantive implications does such knowledge have? In A 
Theory of the Good and the Right, Richard Brandt attempts to an-
swer these perennial questions. Brandt's book will seem hopelessly 
impractical and abstract to those in the legal profession seeking 
ready guidance from specifically stated, easily justified moral rules. 
Readers interested in ethical theory, however, should find Brandt's 
unique blending of psychology and ethics rather ingenious and 
thought-provoking. 
Eschewing the approaches of intuitionists and ordinary language 
philosophers, Brandt draws substantive moral conclusions from ac-
tual behavior, fully criticized in light of relevant factual and logical 
information. A "fully rational person," an individual whose desires 
have survived rational criticism, Brandt contends, will support some 
version of rule utilitarianism over alternative moral systems. 
Brandt divides his book into two parts. Drawing extensively 
from psychological literature, he first assembles his theory of the 
good - the best thing for a "fully rational person" to do. The foun-
dation of this effort is the author's contention, based on psychologi-
cal evidence (pp. 49-57), that individuals tend to act in ways that 
they perceive will best satisfy their desires. Brandt identifies two ha-
9. See, e.g., Macneil, The Many Futures oJ Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV, 691, 808-16 
(1974). 
10. Macneil draws extensively from Weber and Durkheim in his treatment of labor and 
exchange specialization. See, e.g., E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1964); 
M. WEBER, THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947). He modestly notes, 
however, that his work has "yet to pay proper attention to legal history." P. 139 n.25. For a 
classic treatment of the early history of contract, see H. MAINE, ANCIENT LA w 295-354 
(1963); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 591-631 (1948). The most 
recent treatment of contract-law development in the last century is G. GILMORE, THE DEATH 
OF CONTRACT (1977). 
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sic types of "cognitive errors" that impede the maximization of an 
individual's desires. First, by overlooking an act's consequences or 
alternative acts, a person may incorrectly identify the best means to 
satisfy given desires. Second, false beliefs or artificial cultural condi-
tioning may produce "irrational" desires. To expunge cognitive er-
rors, Brandt proposes that individuals repeatedly consider all 
relevant information. Desires which survive such "cognitive psycho-
therapy" Brandt defines as rational; desires in fact abandoned he 
terms irrational (p. 113). Purged of cognitive errors, the fully in-
formed and therefore "rational" individual, Brandt predicts, will in 
fact tend to act so as to maximize satisfaction of his desires (p. 154). 
Here one wonders whether Brandt has over-estimated the indi-
vidual's ability or willingness to change in response to rational criti-
cism. The psychotherapists from whom Brandt freely draws 
certainly hope that rational criticism will reform skewed beliefs, 
desires, and actions. But not may therapists uniformly predict such 
results - witness their doctrine of resistance. Contrary to Brandt's 
expectations, fully informed individuals might not tend to act so as 
to maximally realize their desires, despite the irrationality1 of such 
behavior. Nevertheless, this assumption of rational human motiva-
tion plays a central role in Brandt's overall theory; building upon it, 
he proceeds to demonstrate what kind of moral system will com-
mand allegiance. If his assumption is wrong, however, Brandt has 
two alternatives. First, he might argue that fully informed, "ra-
tional" individuals "should" abandon irrational2 behavioral tenden-
cies that reduce the level of satisfaction otherwise attainable.3 
Alternatively, Brandt might qualify his view regarding the nature of 
the moral system that fully informed persons will support.4 
In the second section of his book, Brandt uses his possibly un-
I. The term is not here used as Brandt defines it. According to Brandt, the person who has 
undergone "cognitive psychotherapy" possesses rational desires and behavioral tendencies by 
definition. Brandt's equation of rational behavior with the maximal satisfaction of desires is 
thus not definitional, but factual. Here, in contrast, "irrational" is used as psychotherapists 
often use it - to describe behavior which unnecessarily restricts an individual's happiness. 
2. See note l supra. 
3. This line of argument would radically alter, if not destroy, the epistemological basis of 
Brandt's theory. Since rationally criticized behavior would not itself lead to Brandt's conclu-
sions, support for them must be found elsewhere. Since Brandt has ruled out intuitions and 
ordinary language, it is not clear what reasons could be adduced to persuade persons that they 
"ought" to maximize their happiness. Brandt would not be content merely to assert that indi-
viduals "should" so act; he wants to avoid the circularity of reasoning from a normative prem-
ise to normative conclusions. P. 154. 
4. Under this alternative, Brandt would be forced to take account of the influence that 
deep-rooted biases which survive "cognitive psychotherapy" have on the moral code adopted 
by a fully informed individual. The possibility that Brandt's "moral" theory might be shaped 
in part by irrational views about women or race relations, for example, is troubling. 
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realistic assessment of human motivation to develop a theory of the 
right - the moral system a fully informed person will favor. Since 
the "rational" person who has undergone "cognitive psychotherapy" 
may or may not be benevolent, Brandt examines what kind of moral 
system both the perfectly benevolent5 individual and the perfectly 
selfish6 individual will favor. 
Brandt concludes that a perfectly benevolent individual will 
favor a code aimed at maximizing the happiness of all sentient crea-
tures (p. 217). More surprisingly, Brandt claims that a perfectly self-
ish person will also tend to endorse such a code: since a moral 
system will neither be implemented nor survive unless it wins the 
cooperation of others, the perfectly selfish individual will support a 
"Hobbesian" code built on some degree of self-restraint and recipro-
cal benefit. The major difference between the benevolent person's 
code and the selfish person's, Brandt surmises, will be that the be-
nevolent individual's code will concern itself with the happiness of 
animals, fetuses, handicapped persons, and future generations, while 
the rational selfish individual will deny the benefit of his moral sys-
tem to those who can neither help nor harm him (p. 221). The selfish 
individual's code, that is, might maximize happiness for one group 
rather than all society, since extending the system's benefits to all 
might not be necessary to safeguard the selfish person's benefit or the 
system's survival. Some will find Brandt's theory unacceptable be-
cause it implies that the rational and "moral" selfish person may jus-
tifiably endorse a moral code that blithely ignores the welfare and 
perhaps countenances the repression of other societal groups. 
Brandt attempts to circumvent this irksome conclusion by contend-
ing that rational selfish individuals will tend to favor egalitarian ar-
rangements which, in the long run, engender less antagonism and 
possess greater stability. 
Next, Brandt argues that rule utilitarianism is the best route to 
maximize aggregate happiness. He finds act utilitarianism unsatis-
factory because it is a single-principle code which merely instructs 
individuals to act in each situation so as to maximize the aggregate 
happiness. Such a system, Brandt remarks, constantly burdens indi-
viduals with complex judgments, renders efficient planning difficult, 
and turns life into an ongoing moral dilemma (pp. 273-77). Brandt 
contends that rule utilitarianism, a set of specifiable rules designed to 
5. Brandt defines the perfectly benevolent person as one who values the happiness of 
others on par with his own. P. 215. 
6. A completely selfish person, Brandt states, is indifferent to others' happiness except to 
the extent that it affects his own welfare. P. 217. 
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maximize aggregate happiness indirectly, avoids such pitfalls. He 
urges that social scientists and philosophers collaborate in the devel-
opment of welfare-maximizing rules. 
Brandt answers the most famous recent anti-utilitarian, John 
Rawls. Brandt first objects to the use of intuitionist epistemology in 
Rawls'sA Theory of Justice .1 Unless our supposed intuitions possess 
an initial credibility, Brandt argues, we have no reason to believe the 
corresponding ethical theory, no matter how internally consistent the 
theory might be. "Is one coherent set of fictions," Brandt asks rhe-
torically, "supposed to be better than another?" (p. 20). Brandt finds 
Rawls's system unconvincing because of the person-to-person varia-
bility and cultural provinciality of Rawls's intuitions. Hence Brandt 
rejects Rawls's contention that hypothetical persons situated in 
the"original position" (a condition of ideal ignorance) would plan a 
''just" society. Rawls would give individuals in the original position 
knowledge that they will live as human beings but keep them igno-
rant of their particular abilities, desires, and economic position. 
Giving the hypothetical planners knowledge that they will be living 
human beings, Brandt contends, stacks the deck against fetuses and 
animals. Moreover, Rawls's implicit notion that the planners' partic-
ular abilities and situation are morally irrelevant, according to 
Brandt, presupposes a benevolence that many "rational" individuals 
do not possess (p. 238). Brandt's criticisms do not irrevocably de-
stroy Rawls's theory but they should force some clarification and re-
vision. 8 Although he perceives weaknesses in Rawls's theory, 
Brandt, as evidenced by his discussion of income redistribution (pp. 
309-26), is anxious to show that his theory shares Rawls's egalitarian 
attraction. 
Although of little immediate practical utility to the lawyer, 
Brandt's book should reward those interested in the ethical basis of a 
system of legal rules. Brandt's work can be taken as a justification 
for the pluralistic, rule-based structure of the existing legal system.9 
Although Brandt's theory does not justify the content of existing le-
gal rules, it does ~dicate the type of argument that one must make to 
7. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
8. For Rawls's response to essentially similar criticisms, see Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 
84 PHILOSOPHY REV. 536 (1975). 
9. Members of the legal profession might be interested in Brandt's comments about. the 
comparative advantages of abstract versus specific rules. Brandt observes that abstract rules 
can be fewer in number and possess greater generality while, in concrete situations, the aver-
age person will more easily infer the proper application of a specific rule. Accordingly, Brandt 
recommends that a moral code use specific rules for frequently arising situations or where 
predictability is important. P. 290. 
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criticize or justify such rules. In Brandt's view, such claims must be 
grounded in scientific data and phrased in terms of the maximization 
of welfare, not intuited principles. One may legitimately question 
Brandt's view of the close relationship between psychology and mo-
rality; his theory seems to presuppose a rationality beyond the capac-
ity or willingness of some individuals. As a basis for moral 
conclusions, actual behavior, maximally criticized by facts and logic, 
is therefore not as useful as Brandt believes. But at the very least, 
Brandt furnishes a challenging alternative to intuitionist and ordi-
nary language theories. 10 
10. Brandt's book is also reviewed by Cohen, Book Review, 30 PHILOSOPHY Q. 271 (1980); 
Emmet, Book Review, 55 PHILOSOPHY 412 (1980); Mitchell, Book Review, 21 PHILOSOPHY 
BOOKS 223 (1980); Quinton, Morals and Marxism, TIMES LIT. SUPP., Jan. 4, 1980, at 18, 
